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10 May 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

***Sino-Soviet Relations:** The delegates that the Chinese propose to send to Moscow in mid-June for bilateral talks have records of unyielding militancy in previous negotiations with the Soviets.

Politburo member Peng Chen, for example, exchanged angry insults with Khrushchev at closed-door sessions of the Bucharest meeting in June 1960. General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping was similarly adamant at the meeting of international Communist leaders in Moscow the following November.

Both the Soviets and the Chinese have indicated, however, that they expect the negotiations to be protracted and difficult. In their letters arranging the conference, each side presented the issues to be discussed in diametrically opposed formulations and insisted there can be no compromise on principles.

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The Chinese probably plan to continue their running battle with the Soviets outside the conference room. They are [redacted] initiating a new campaign to circulate reprints of their polemical articles among Communists in other countries. [redacted]
[redacted]

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Colombia: Ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla may attempt to exploit political unrest in Colombia by using a mass rally planned for 10 May--the anniversary of Rojas' overthrow--to spark a general uprising against the Valencia government.

Communists and other extremist groups reportedly have offered to throw their support behind the large delegations from throughout the country which will attend the rally in Bogota. Rojas also expects to receive substantial support from the armed forces. Leftist extremists may also attempt violence independently of the pro-Rojas rally.

Minister of Defense Ruiz and his senior commanders have issued a public declaration of their support of the administration and have taken special security measures. However, the police and military forces in the capital would be hard pressed to maintain public order should Rojas supporters succeed in massing the up to 50,000 demonstrators which they claim will participate. Army strength in the Bogota area has been depleted by the transfer of several units to areas of rural violence.

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Bolivia: The Communist Youth of Bolivia (JCB) may be planning violence against the US Embassy or the embassy residence in La Paz.

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[redacted] the recent death of a peasant leader, Tomas Lovera, as a pretext for a demonstration to embarrass the Paz government. Lovera died in an incident involving government security agents.

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The government's anti-extremist operations are having an increasingly injurious effect on Communist-linked organizations. These operations have probably also seriously diminished the support of rural areas for Vice President Juan Lechin, long Bolivia's key labor leader. Lechin reportedly told Paz he would instruct his followers to take reprisals unless those responsible for Lovera's death were found and punished.

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***Argentina:** The US Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that detailed accounts of friction in the Argentine cabinet, published by the press and radio on 9 May, may lead to the resignation of several ministers within the next 48 hours.

The embassy comments that Interior Minister Rauch's recent campaign against politically suspect elements, including adherents of Peron, former President Frondizi, and Frondizi's adviser, Rogelio Frigerio, may have precipitated a struggle for power within the cabinet.

This campaign, which is in preparation for the July elections, could result in fairly drastic cabinet changes, according to the embassy; but there is presently no threat of a military coup. [redacted]

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NOTES

USSR - East Germany: Three Soviet medium tanks of a new type have been observed for the first time at a recent Soviet Armed Forces demonstration in East Germany. These are probably the T-62 tanks which went into production in 1961 and are armed with a 115-mm. smoothbore gun with extremely high muzzle velocity and greatly improved armor-piercing capabilities. The Soviets reportedly believe that the T-62 is superior to the US M-60 medium tank and may even be able to hold its own against Western heavy tanks.

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Communist China: The Chinese Communists appear anxious to assure the West that they will try to keep any future military clashes with India from exceeding the 1962 scale. Chief of State Liu Shao-chi recently told the Swedish ambassador in Peiping that if renewed fighting were provoked by India, the Chinese would again make only a limited advance into Indian territory and then withdraw to their present positions. Liu boasted of the great self-confidence of Chinese forces following their defeat of India last fall.

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Communist China - India: Efforts by the Chinese Communists to brainwash Indian prisoners appear to have been aimed mainly at driving a wedge between Indians and the Gurkha soldiers serving with Indian forces. [redacted]


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[redacted] the Chinese stressed their "fraternal" relationship with the Gurkhas--a people of Mongoloid stock --and gave Gurkha prisoners preferential treatment. These tactics are in line with Peiping's long-term campaign to attract Nepal--home of the Gurkhas--toward Communist China.) [redacted]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on 8 May 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

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SNIE 30-2-63: "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel"



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